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Abstract 
This article proposes and fleshes-out an analytical method designed to support efforts to 
transform inequitable and unsustainable transboundary water arrangements. Such 
‘transformative analysis’ leverages socio-ecological thinking to critically evaluate the 
processes that have established and maintain an arrangement, including hydro-diplomacy 
itself. The benefits of transformative analysis include facilitation of i) interpretation of 
strategies to deflect transformation, ii) identification of destructive forms of cooperation, and 
iii) strategic classification of opportunities for transformation. The assertions are premised on 
an understanding of the particularities of water conflict, and followed by a discussion of ways 
researchers may overcome the challenges that are inherent with the method. 
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Water conflicts in the spotlight 
At its broadest level, this article seeks to ensure that research is more relevant to efforts to 
improve environmental conflicts. Focusing the debates about the extent to which ‘the 
environment’ is a source of conflict (see Box 1) onto inequitable transboundary water 
arrangements, the article develops a method to help with their transformation. Though water 
often occupies central stage in the environmental conflict policy arena (Solow 2013), the bulk 
of water conflict research has proven to be of little effect in the diplomatic efforts to ease 
tensions and shape the institutions that govern international water sharing, not least of all 
along the Jordan and Nile rivers that are explored here.   
If the goal of diplomacy is to render transboundary water arrangements more equitable and 
sustainable (and this is not always the case), the article argues, ‘transformative analysis’ must 
critically evaluate the processes that establish and maintain the arrangements. This is 
particularly so when there is a structured asymmetry in power (i.e. a context of hydro-
hegemony), but it obliges overcoming the difficulties inherent with such politically-sensitive 
and interdisciplinary research.  
Because the benefits of transformative analysis are so numerous that they can fill a book,1 
the focus here is on just a few: the benefits of in-depth case studies; the acute assessment of 
existing arrangements; the interpretation of strategies to deflect transformation; the 
identification of destructive cooperation; and the strategic classification of opportunities for 
transformation. The argument is premised on an understanding of the particular ways that 
humans use and fight over water and that a socio-ecological (or hydro-social) interpretation 
of water resources availability and use fits best with the practice of water conflict 
transformation, be it activism, counter-hegemonic movements, or inter-state negotiations.  
The intended audience is other hydropolitical researchers and activist scholars that are aware 
of and care about the processes that may take up their research. It may come as little surprise 
to scholars of this Special Issue on hydro-diplomacy to read yet another endorsement of the 
benefits of leveraging the synergy that derives from blending disciplines and epistemologies 
(Max-Neef 2005)(see Box 2). It is still rare enough, however, for the environmental conflict 
and water policy research communities to be encouraged – as they are here – to combine 
hydro-geology with political ecology, International Relations and soils science, or to collect 
flow gauge data as complement to interviews, observations, and trawls through dusty 
archives. The challenges inherent with these data collection and analytical methods are 
compounded when water arrangements are so ‘securitized’ that transformation appears 
infeasible and data is not readily shared, but they can be overcome through careful design of 
the research and other manners discussed in the Conclusion. 
                                                   
1 Indeed, transformative analysis for transboundary waters is further conceptualised and applied in detail 
in the comprehensive monograph Zeitoun et al. (forthcoming). 
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Definitions 
A transboundary water arrangement is understood to mean the treaties, protocols, river 
basin commissions and other institutional structures that shape policy and use of 
transboundary waters (primarily) between states. Inequitable arrangements are those that 
lack key elements of a model arrangement, including fairness (as defined by the ‘equitable 
and reasonable’ principle of International Water Law). Such transboundary water 
arrangements are considered unsustainable by definition, in the sense that people will always 
seek to change inequitable situations, though the term is also discussed loosely in the sense 
of sustainable use. Transformation is understood to refer to structural changes in the 
processes that shape existing arrangements (primarily) between states over international 
watercourses. Not all transformation is ‘positive’ or desired by the majority of people 
involved; after all, re-arranging established arrangements of any sort can lead to a whole new 
set of tensions and/or unexpected outcomes. 
The need for transformative analysis  
Limitations of conventional analysis 
The body of knowledge of transboundary water arrangements varies in form from policy-
oriented reports or technical research that aims to enable more effective infrastructure or 
institutions from within existing arrangements (UNEP/MAP/MED POL 2005, e.g. Grey, et al. 
2009, Pernetta, et al. 2012, EcoPeace 2015, Sadoff, et al. 2015) to sharply critical articles and 
investigating the roots of water conflicts (Suhardiman, et al. 2014, Menga, et al. 2016, 
Warner, et al. 2017). Like the reports, the peer-reviewed articles cannot fully conceal their 
objective of (somehow) ‘improving’ the transboundary water arrangement being examined – 
though this is always unstated. Another thing the disparate forms of literature have in 
common is their minimal influence over the processes that drive or sustain the conflictual 
arrangement they focus on.  
Consider the relevancy of reams of conventional research on the asymmetric arrangements  
along the Jordan and Nile rivers and associated aquifers.2 A great body of policy and academic 
research  exists on both rivers, such that there is little contestation over the shares in control 
over the flows: roughly 90% and 85% by Israel and Egypt, respectively (NBI 2006, Zeitoun 
2008, World Bank 2009, Granit, et al. 2010, Alatout 2011, NBDF 2011, Cascão 2014, Cascão, 
et al. 2016). Both transboundary water arrangements have drawn-in third parties to mediate, 
whether the American and European diplomatic interventions in the 1980s and 1990s in 
Jordanian-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli discussions, or the World Bank and UNDP via the Nile 
Basin Initiative (NBI) and the Cooperative Framework Agreement. As elaborated in Zeitoun et 
                                                   
2 Two of the authors have been directly involved in the related diplomatic processes for sustained periods of 
time.  
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al  (2019), each context has also been the stage for debate about the prevention, 
management, resolution or transformation of water conflicts. Neither arrangement has 
benefited from the reams of literature directed at it, though, at least not when considered in 
terms of equity or sustainability.  
Policy reports have played their part, whether the DFID-supported groundwater mapping of 
the West Bank (SUSMAQ 2003), the Multilateral Working Group on Water Resources on the 
Jordan River (EXACT 2005), the many reports of the NBI Secretariat (NBI 2012, NBI 2016), or 
of the Eastern Nile Technical Regional Office (ENTRO). Work examining the biophysical or 
social impacts of dams along the Nile is equally relevant (Wheeler, et al. 2016, Siam, et al. 
2017), and the body of work has certainly helped to forge a more comprehensive and 
common understanding of the biophysical parameters of the river basins and aquifers in 
questions, while the resultant transparency has served to dispel the contention over 
conflicting data sets that characterised the earlier decades of each conflict.  
Too little of this work has been drawn upon by the social science community, however. The 
community has thus – generally – missed potential contributions to conflict transformation 
that might have come through consideration of the effective pollution filtering role that the 
karst limestone aquifer (along the Jordan) plays, as one example, or the amount of food 
produced through rainfed agriculture (in the upper Nile). Moreover, what the great bulk of 
conventional socio-political analysis on the Jordan has failed to do is examine the structural 
inequities that underlie the transboundary water governance arrangement (e.g. Lonergan, et 
al. 1994, Sherman 1999, Allan 2001, Brooks, et al. 2010, Feitelson, et al. 2017). If this body of 
word had done so, light would have been shed onto the risk of the Joint Water Committee 
becoming not a forum of model cooperation (as it had asserted), but an institution that very 
effectively restricted the development of Palestinian statehood (World Bank 2009), or served 
as a tool of Israeli colonization of the West Bank (Selby 2013). Socio-political analysis 
conducted prior to the dramatic 2010 changes on the Nile (Mason 2003, Kameri-Mbote 2006, 
Phillips, et al. 2009), meanwhile, managed to skirt the issue at the heart of the contentions – 
the 1959 Sudan-Egypt agreement that allocated the bulk of the flows to the latter (and none 
to any of the other riparian states). The issue of allocation was not forensically and 
methodologically excavated even though there were signs that the 1959 agreement would 
threaten inter-state relations during the decades of heightened NBI activity, and well before 
the beginning of the end of the NBI in 2007 (Cascão, in Zeitoun, et al. forthcoming 2018) the 
political revolution in Egypt in 2011, or Ethiopia’s announcement of the construction of the 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) less than a month later. 
As such, and despite its many other merits, the bulk of socio-political analysis cannot claim to 
have made any significant difference to the transboundary water arrangements on either the 
Jordan or the Nile. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that first necessary (though not 
sufficient) steps would for social research to make more of the technical reports, to study 
power politics, or to incorporate complexity science (e.g. Jones 2015), amongst other oft-
repeated pearls of wisdom. But if analysis is to be relevant to the inequitable transboundary 
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water arrangements, it will have go further – to understand and engage with the processes 
and structures that maintain them, and identify potential for their transformation. 
How a focus on conflict transformation can help 
Looking at it broadly, the more conventional socio-political analysis seems well-suited for 
relevance to the practice of conflict management, whose goal is to avoid the degradation of 
water conflicts, especially to becoming overtly violent. The conceptions, analytical 
approaches and policy tools that are provided appeal to mediators keen to tweak or maintain 
an arrangement, such as state or corporate diplomats, activists, and lending banks (e.g. 
USACE 1996, Delli-Priscoli, et al. 2008, United Nations and World Bank 2018). The easy uptake 
into policy is lubricated at least in part by the tendency  of the analyses to avoid the thorny 
political issues, or ‘upsetting the applecart’. An un-stated bias is set up, however, in not 
challenging the status quo, as the trade-offs and compromises managed by the third parties 
that make use of the analysis are more likely to originate from the narratives of the prevailing 
actors (see Zeitoun, et al. 2011, Zeitoun, et al. 2016). Even as the conflict is steered away from 
(open) violence, then, it is shepherded safely within the confines of the status quo that have 
been set by the more powerful actors – and the conflict lingers, neither significantly changed, 
nor resolved (Mirumachi 2018). Such perpetuation of the water conflict is especially troubling 
when water diplomacy is pursued with an expressed will to harmonise interventions with 
national security interests (e.g. CNA 2017: 4, EcoPeace-INSS 2018: 3). There is thus reason for 
concern about the assumptions that analysts make in regard to the role of third-party 
mediators, especially in a context of hydro-hegemony. The concern can be alleviated by an 
acknowledged awareness or at least more open treatment of the conflict management 
processes that the analysts contribute to. 
By contrast, other protagonists in a conflict will foreground the thorny issues, and see any 
resolution of conflict necessarily emerging through a change to the status quo. In contrast to 
conflict management, the goal of conflict transformation is to replace an undesirable situation 
with one that is preferred (see Kriesberg 2009), ideally (if not practically) by all involved. Based 
on Lederach (2003, 2005), the core of the conflict transformation approach is a recognition 
that all political matters (such as water conflicts) are contentious and contestable, and always 
will be. Change in any arrangement is likely to favour some groups of people at the expense 
of others. Efforts to transform conflict thus require double the sweat that is spent on conflict 
management, as they will have to overcome predictable resistance from those powerful 
actors with a stake in the status quo.  
Conflict transformation efforts nonetheless hold the potential to overhaul conflicts through 
constructive processes of change. The transformation could be of the actors, issues, rules or 
structures that maintain any arrangement (Väyrynen 1991 in Botes 2003), as seen at least in 
part in Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Georgia (Mac Ginty 
2014). As just one of many long-term benefits deriving from cases where the fundamental 
aspects of a conflict are actually transformed, the resultant arrangement creates stronger 
 
Analysis for Water Conflict Transformation – 12 April 2019    6 of 21 
relations between the actors, and liberates energies for more productive endeavours – which 
can be alluring propositions even to the more recalcitrant parties. Conflict transformation is 
worth the extra effort, in other words. But conflict transformation demands considerable skill 
and art from seasoned mediators – and a similarly appropriate analysis.  
 
The premise of transformative analysis  
The argument for the hydropolitical researchers to undertake transformative analysis could 
be premised on a case made of any combination of numerous factors that the body of 
knowledge has highlighted, including the multiple causes of conflict; perceptions of root 
causes; the importance of history and narratives; how water treaties can incorporate changes 
in water needs or availability, and many more. This section examines just three: the 
particularity of water conflicts, the reasons for their silent running, and the benefits of a 
hydro-social  interpretation of water.  
The particularities of transboundary waters shape the way it is contested 
A comprehensive review of violent conflict (generally) finds it to be context-specific, multi-
causal, and multi-dimensional, and the result of institutional, socio-economic, and resource 
and environmental factors (Haider 2014). Whether violent or not, natural resource-related 
conflicts typically exhibit qualities from each category, in different admixtures. All natural 
resources are used, valued, and fought over by humans in different ways, however, and a 
deep dive into the dynamics associated with the material aspects of the natural resources will 
be most relevant to any practice of conflict transformation. 
The most distinguishing feature of water is its renewability from the atmosphere to the earth, 
and back again. Unlike forests, the cycle generally occurs at rate of months or hours, 
depending very much on climatic conditions and how water is used. It follows that concerns 
about biophysical scarcity of water (or abundance, in the case of floods) are about protection, 
equity of access, and rates of use, rather than water ‘running out’ at the global level. The 
global perspective has led to concepts that illuminate limits on some natural resources – e.g. 
planetary thresholds (Rockström, et al. 2009) and ‘peak water’ (Gleick, et al. 2010),  but these 
add no clarity when applied to water use, where limits are determined and felt much more 
locally and in terms of shifting rates of change. All water resource concerns – and so 
contentions, and so conflict – are circumscribed by water use and whether it affects the users 
directly, and so can vary tremendously in shape and severity from the village to the 
continental level.3  
Unlike diamonds and oil, furthermore, water is not ‘lootable’ in any meaningful volumes or 
economic value (see Le Billon 2006). In the quantities that it is coveted, water is too heavy 
and energy-consuming to be stolen, or converted into cash. The relatively minute economic 
                                                   
3 Refer to Box 1 for discussion of the lack of basis to the widely-held view that global water scarcity itself drives 
conflict. 
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value of water is particularly brief, and limited to its contribution to the value of the crops 
that it helps to grow or goods that it can help to produce. While an oil field can support entire 
state economies, including the very expensive war infrastructure usually required to justify a 
military battle or invasion, even the largest intensively irrigated and productive agricultural 
fields cannot.  
Water conflicts run silent because of food imports and power plays 
A thorough review of contests over international transboundary waters finds they are driven 
by struggles for control, access and use, or connection with national identity  (Haftendorn 
2000, Ruettinger, et al. 2011). Unlike most of the public attention and resistance given to the 
construction of dams, tensions over international water conflicts rarely manifest themselves 
in violent terms, and so can be considered somewhat ‘hidden’, or invisible, or at least silent. 
Analysis will have to draw on the best of economics, agronomy, sociology and hydrology and 
others, if it is to  begin to identify and interpret the key elements of water conflicts. 
Consider the option that most governments have to import food, often cited as one factor 
explaining the silent nature of water conflicts (Allan 2002). Importing food grown with water 
in another country – or ‘virtual water’ (Allan 2011) – means that a national government can 
use less of water within its territory, or use such water for other activities that bring higher 
economic returns (i.e. using water for industry rather than for agriculture – see Barnaby 
(2009)). In this way, water is replaceable (or ‘fungible’, in the language of International 
Relations), and food imports act as a valve that relieves the pressure on the local water 
resources that would otherwise be used. The Nile conflict would likely be much more acute, 
for instance, if the government of Egypt did not have the option to import wheat or beef from 
Russia, Argentina, or Sudan through long-established trading arrangements.  
Transboundary water conflicts are also somewhat hidden because they are determined in 
large part by the asymmetry in power between the riparian states. Consider the fact that 
there is no instance of a water-sharing arrangement that is both inequitable and in favour the 
less powerful actor. Many of the inequitable arrangements are ‘hegemonic’, furthermore, 
meaning they are maintained both by the use (or threat of the use) of force by the more 
powerful actor, as well as the consent of the less powerful actor (Zeitoun, et al. 2006).  
That power has many forms, and some of it operates very subtly – particularly the ‘soft’ power 
that can result in unexpressed contestation of the arrangement (Zeitoun, et al. 2016). It 
follows that formal governmental consent to any arrangement might be tactical or strategic 
– like Ethiopia’s participation in the NBI processes, before it began to more openly contest 
the Nile arrangement, or enduring Palestinian participation at the Joint Water Committee 
(Selby 2007). Tensions can indeed be difficult to detect if drawing attention to them is not in 
the interest of the more powerful actors and the arrangement is openly consented to by the 
less powerful actor, if the effects of power asymmetry are not explicitly sought by the analyst. 
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Hydro-social thinking is more illuminating  
Because the effects of scarcity of water plays out in society, as previously discussed, a strictly 
biophysical interpretation of any transboundary water arrangement will reveal less than half 
of the picture. A further reason that biophysical scarcity is not (necessarily) a driver of conflict, 
is because scarcity is relative. Water scarcity is a function of water need, in other words, 
whether that need be human, animal, or environmental. If there was no ‘need’ for water (in 
a desert, say), there would be no ‘scarcity’, in the social sense of the term.  
The need for water can be created, furthermore (see Mehta 2011), as demonstrated by the 
well-known case of asparagus grown in the Ica/Huanica Valley in coastal Peru for 
consumption in Europe. The asparagus spears are pushed out of the sands with the utmost 
efficiency (through drip irrigation), and sold the world over. Growers have achieved such a 
high irrigation efficiency rate, that they have managed to divert the headwaters of the 
Amazon to sustain expansion their farms, once the groundwater table had been abstracted 
beyond the feasible limits of the pumps (Hepworth, et al. 2010). Where and how water the 
river and groundwater are used are as much a function of the political economy driving 
European ‘need’ for asparagus, then, as they are of the sunshine. Export-bound herbs grown 
in Israel and rice grown in Egypt are similar cases of ‘desert bloom syndrome’, to use Molle et 
al’s (2008) term. Power and power asymmetry underlie how and when water is allocated, 
linking strategies and tactics of hydro-hegemony conveniently with hydro-social 
interpretations of water resources.  Greening a desert is simple, and profitable enough, but 
not environmentally sustainable. It is politically sustainable, unless the flows come from a 
transboundary resource that is contested by neighbours.  
‘Sustainable’ is itself a contested term, of course. Like water scarcity, sustainable levels of 
water use are very much determined water use and need. Hydrology and hydro-geology help 
to define limits that can be placed on abstractions, and any transboundary water 
arrangement would benefit from a solid understanding of the long-term average volume of 
river flows, and the extent to which they are seasonal or changing with climate (Taylor 2009, 
Jarvis 2019). But it is no mean feat for transformative analysis to interpret the ‘sustainable’ 
limits of a river or an aquifer. The analytical task is particularly problematic for aquifers, 
because often, the more groundwater that is pumped out of an aquifer, the more water 
rushes in from adjoining ones.4 The task is more difficult still when the hydraulic connections 
of the aquifer pass under political borders – and there is no study that has robustly quantified 
transboundary groundwater (including in the West Bank, despite the relatively great number 
SUSMAQ studies), nor is there even an agreed methodology to do so.  
Such assertions in no way discount the importance of conventional hydrological and 
hydrogeological methods of calculating water availability. Logic does obliges expanding 
beyond them, however. When it comes to incorporating sustainability and scarcity into 
transformative analysis, the classic concept of the hydro-cycle is a hindrance more than a 
                                                   
4 Any idea of a ‘safe yield’ from an aquifer is thereby considered a “myth” (Jarvis 2014). 
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help. Because the classic concept presents the movement of water from cloud to earth as 
devoid of human influence, it leads conceptualisation away from the processes that stem 
from constantly changing features of society and the economy. A much more effective way 
of getting to the root of any sort of sustainable limits is via the ‘hydro-social cycle’ (Linton 
2010) or through the hydro-social spiral shown in Figure 1, as this addresses the false sense 
of stability that a cycle implies (Farnum, et al. 2018). Rooted in the socio-ecology tradition, 
the concept of the hydro-social cycle emphasises that analysts really cannot and should not 
attempt to separate water resources from water use. The implications for transboundary 
water arrangements are clear: groundwater pumping that induces lateral flows across a 
border (as in the A7/B2 Aquifer that lies partially under the hydrological basin of the Yarmouk 
tributary to the Jordan, in Syria and Jordan (UEA 2018)), like the export of food out of the 
basin they are produced in, are further relevant components of the water conflict that must 
therefore be factored into transformative analysis.  
Figure 1. Farnum, Thompson and MacDougall’s hydro-social spiral. Drawing attention to both the high degree 
of instability and its human drivers, the spiral provides a more stable foundation of understanding upon which 
conflict transformation efforts may be built. (Farnum, et al. 2018). Hi-res version to be provided prior to 
publication.  
 
The benefits of transformative analysis  
If transformative analysis is to render transboundary water arrangements more equitable and 
sustainable, it must leverage the best of socio-ecological/hydro-social thinking to critically 
evaluate the processes that establish and maintain them. As discussed following, the benefits 
of doing so include the useful assessment of existing arrangements, interpretation of 
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strategies to deflect transformation, identification of destructive cooperation, and the 
strategic classification of opportunities for transformation. 
First benefit: Useful assessment of existing arrangements 
Though it may be straightforward to identify the inequitable and unsustainable parts of any 
transboundary water arrangement, specifying what an improved arrangement looks like is 
much less so. Does the arrangement require an international agreement, for example, how 
will the new arrangement adapt to future changes, and how ‘fair’ is it in the first place? 
Where a transboundary water arrangement is regulated by an international agreement, the 
agreement in question is readily assessed by comparison with the key features identified by 
analysis done on model water agreements and treaties. A wide variety of perspectives have 
weighed-in on the task, emphasising that resilient agreement should cover conjunctive use of 
groundwater and surface water, strong institutional mechanisms (such as joint committees 
and dispute resolution mechanisms), and provisions to maintain water quality and ecosystem 
integrity (see e.g. Conca 2006, UNECE 2013, Dinar, et al. 2015).  
A particularly robust transboundary water agreement would be able to adapt to 
circumstances that are different than they were at the time of signing, whether that be 
reductions in water availability due to climate change (Jafroudi 2018), or increased demand 
for water due to sudden increases in population (as in Jordan, due to the influx of people 
fleeing the war in neighbouring Syria (Muller, et al. 2016)). Adaptability can be relatively easily 
written into a treaty through ‘re-visiting clauses’, as with the case of the Columbia River treaty 
that triggered its review forty years later, in 2016, and likely re-negotiation (Cosens, et al. 
2012). It is of course never certain that the political will and foresight that existed at the time 
of concluding an agreement will be present at the time its designated re-negotiation. 
Analysis that can transform an arrangement would do well to investigate a further notable 
aspect of a model treaty: the quality of its allocation mechanism. This relates to the 
‘equitable’ part of the definition of a desired transboundary water arrangement, and may be 
most readily gauged by comparing it to International Water Law (IWL), particularly as codified 
in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC). The share of control and use of the 
transboundary flows stipulated by IWL is referred to as the ‘legal entitlement’ of each state, 
and – for all its limitations (D'Souza 2010) – may be the least worst way for analysis to evaluate 
the fairness of an allocation mechanism, or actual distribution of use or control over the flows. 
The legal entitlement is defined through the obligation that states use international 
watercourses in an “equitable and reasonable” manner. ‘Equitable’ is used in contrast to 
equal here, for explicitly acknowledging that use of a transboundary watercourse is not 
necessarily best split in identical shares between the many states may make a claim to the 
watercourse. The analysis required to interpret the legal entitlement is relatively 
straightforward, a matter of quantifying economic needs and access to alternative water 
sources, as explained in the UNWC User’s Guide (Rieu-Clarke, et al. 2012), and applied in the 
cases of the Jordan and Nile watercourses (Moussa 2013, Quba’a, et al. 2017), amongst 
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countless others. Such quantification is quickly taken up by different actors pushing for 
transformation, even if IWL itself is no less immune to the vagaries of power that ultimately 
determine most arrangements in hegemonic settings.5 
Second benefit: Interpretation of strategies to deflect transformation  
Compromise on water conflicts can be very difficult for state actors or negotiators, because 
water issues are frequently wrapped up with national identity, and readily framed in terms of 
national security. The official view of sequential governments in Egypt, for instance, was that 
any upstream development on the Nile would threaten the political existence of the country 
(Allouche 2004). In a country that receives almost no rain and which hosts millions of farmers 
dependent on the river for their living, the assertion can to be taken up by citizens and 
residents – even if it makes no account for food imported or exported, or soil water, or the 
very many other issues that comprise a state’s integrity (identity, military, history, etc.).  
Framing water issues in existential terms serves to foreclose normal political discussion – and 
has been labelled ‘securitization’ (Buzan, et al. 1998). Once waters are securitized, the 
concession and compromise required for alterations to a transboundary water arrangement 
is difficult to achieve (Mirumachi 2013), and obliges for the diplomat the task of de-
securitising (see Weinthal, et al. 2015).  The upper and Yarmouk tributaries of the Jordan River 
are examples of water issues that are so politically heightened that even basic hydrological 
data (in Syria, and, to a lesser extent, Israel), is hidden, and discussion of equitable sharing a 
sure exit point to deliberations (2015, UEA 2018, Wine 2018). 
One way for the analyst to help de-securitise6 is by exploding the underlying logic upon which 
securitised assertions are made. The task of the transformative analyst thus becomes, for 
example, to expose the dissonance between the claims of those who securitize, and the 
national ‘need’ for water in terms of availability and use of water. The transparency created 
by basic hydrology, hydro-geology, and political economics are useful here, in the way that 
the technical reports in the Jordan and Nile cases served to shift the debates over numbers, 
as previously discussed. Such analysis could be extended to investigate the extent of pressure  
that food imports relieve of local water resources, or the corresponding stress induced by 
food exports. An assessment of the legal entitlement and inevitability of development of 
upstream states would also serve to desecuritize – and might help all involved to begin to 
                                                   
5 Amongst several other obligations, the UNWC asserts that all states have a ‘duty to cooperate’ which obliges 
all parties to do so on the basis of “sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit, and good faith”. 
Precisely because it applies to hegemonic actors who may be resistant to changes in the arrangement, the ‘Duty 
of Cooperation’ has been considered the main obligation through which IWL has the potential to address power 
asymmetries by ‘levelling the playing field’, thereby giving the possibility of transforming the conflict (Farnum, 
et al. 2017). 
6 De-securitization tactics can follow many strategies (Buzan, et al. 1998, Roe 2004) that have been identified in 
relation by Biba (2016) to transboundary water arrangements on the Mekong as: passive recipient strategy 
(ignoring the securitizing moves until they abate or stop), blocking strategy (asserting the issue as not 
securitized), or active reshaping strategy (essentially, the blocking strategy complemented by action to 
incorporate the securitizing actor’s concerns). 
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anticipate tensions in a way that enables pro-active adaptation to them (see e.g. Weinthal, et 
al. 2015), and/or develop workarounds. 
Like any environmental issue, furthermore, water conflicts are also prone to being framed as 
‘non-issues’. The term a-politicisation, or ‘naturalisation’ (Forsyth 2003) is used to identify the 
attribution of political issues to ‘natural’ causes. One very commonly seen form of 
naturalisation is the attribution of blame for problems created by unsustainable water 
policies on climate change. Such mis-placed accountability thus removes the (human-made) 
water policies from any potential solution, and this can be just as debilitating as the 
securitisation of a conflict. Steps towards transformation are impeded because deliberation 
about their human causes (the ones that can be ‘worked on’) is, at the very least, discouraged. 
The focus on the effects of climate change on the Eastern Nile or Jordan are evidence of the 
uptake (Rimmer, et al. 2011, Conway 2017). The task of the transformative analyst in this 
situation is to provide a rigorous base of evidence upon which discussion and policy or 
diplomacy may ensue. Technical studies are often seen by policy-makers as ‘safe’ ways into 
politically-sensitive subjects, and utilising data and information to build a case to revisit such 
problems created by water policies can be a first step in the right direction – so  long of course 
as the technical analysis does not displace the blended hydro-social analysis, or avoid the 
thorny issues. Analysis that exposes such naturalisation would also serve to re-focus on the 
sources of the problem, and of the solutions.  
Third Benefit: Identification of destructive cooperation 
Like a caterpillar morphing into a butterfly, ‘conflict’ can be a necessary step towards 
equitable and sustainable transboundary water arrangements. Openly-expressed 
disagreement can be constructive, in other words, when it leads issues onto a stage where 
they can be dealt with. In contrast to such constructive conflict, some cooperation can be 
problematic. Like the prisoner ordered to ‘cooperate’ by the guard that is seeking to extract 
information, or an employment contract signed under duress, cooperation can be coercive; 
it can even be downright ugly.  
Skewed transboundary water treaties can be the result of this type of cooperation. The work 
on model water agreements has found the skew to be the result of deliberate ambiguity in 
the clauses, for example, or inequitable allocation mechanisms and misleading 
communications (see e.g. Zentner 2012, Dinar, et al. 2015). When the skew favours the basin 
hegemon, and is consented to by a marginalised weaker party, the agreement becomes an 
effective tool to maintain the (similarly asymmetric) transboundary water arrangement – as 
with the 1994 Jordan and 1959 Nile agreements. With the passage of time, changed 
circumstances, and growing awareness, these agreements became a more visible source of 
conflict, as was the case with the 1994 OKACOM Agreement in southern Africa (Davidsen 
2006, Carles forthcoming 2019), between Brazil and Paraguay on the Paraná River [get year 
and date of the treaty], and the 1996 Ganges Treaty (Thomas 2017). 
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Detecting the skew in a treaty requires analysis of its clauses, just as evaluation of the form 
of cooperation in any arrangement obliges examination of the extend to which it has shaped 
the outcome. Overlooking destructive cooperation or mistaking it for something more 
‘positive’ can also be avoided if analysts define what is meant by ‘cooperation’,7 and evaluate 
the coordination observed between the parties against it.8  
Fourth benefit: Strategic classification of opportunities for transformation 
Particularly when an inequitable transboundary water arrangement is resistant to change 
(whether due to hegemony, securitisation or naturalisation), analysis that is to be relevant 
must identify opportunities for transformation. The more that the analysis is able to develop 
s opportunities into a strategy, the more relevant it will be, still. To borrow a concept from 
negotiations theory, a strategy to encourage opportunities for transformative analysis would 
put more options on the negotiations table, and make the ‘solutions pie’ bigger.  
The default source of opportunities is the alternative ideas, visions, and narratives that are 
not picked up by conventional hydropolitical or technical analysis, because of the dominance 
of the prevailing narratives about the conflict, as previously discussed. Put another way, ideas 
about transformation can come from left field, or from the less powerful voices, and so should 
be sought there. The fertile ground for options for transformation is to be found in the non-
hegemonic states, then – and perhaps even more so in the trans-national coordination 
between groups in civil society.  
Windows of opportunity can open with sudden changes in climate or political regimes, or with 
the development of a new water technology or irrigation techniques. One common form of 
opportunities is the benefits produced by the rivers or aquifers (Sadoff, et al. 2002), notably 
hydro-electricity, or food. A secure food or oil import agreement has the potential to take the 
stress off of the securitised freshwater, for instance, just as would the sale or exchange of 
electrical power – notwithstanding the risks of inducing naturalisation processes, or those 
associated with increased dependency on other countries and decision-makers beyond one’s 
control. Changes to the political economic structures within which the water conflict plays 
out (e.g. international food or energy or geopolitical arrangements) thus have the potential 
to be truly transformational, and could be assisted by the quantification of virtual water flows, 
for example, or practical application of the more critical research on water-energy-food nexus 
work (Mayor, et al. 2015).  
A number of inter-disciplinary methods on offer to the transformative analyst for exploring 
benefits. The Transboundary Water Opportunity analysis derives the ‘benefits wheel’ which 
seeks to combine the hydrological and biophysical understandings of the water with poverty 
reduction, agricultural activity, and political stability (Phillips, et al. 2010). Building on this, 
                                                   
7 A Typology of ‘cooperation’ is offered in Zeitoun et al (2019). 
8 A particularly useful tool for this is the Transboundary Water Interaction NexuS (Mirumachi 2015), which 
defines intensities of cooperation and conflict, pits them against each other, and permits visual interpretation 
of the dynamics that maintains any arrangement (or that may allow it to transform).  
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and the most tangible policy outcome of hydro-social thinking, the Quantitative Water 
Allocation Framework fleshes-out the benefits / from agriculture and industrial development, 
to the energy and domestic water sectors, and environmental flows reserved for ‘nature’ 
(Phillips, et al. 2017, Woodhouse, et al. not published). Each of these types of benefits are 
associated explicitly with many forms of water, be it surface, groundwater, soil water or 
virtual water.  
 
Proceed with consideration 
As it has been sketched-out, transformative analysis obliges leveraging of the synergy that 
derives from blending disciplinary approaches and epistemologies. All the common risks 
associated with such blending apply here, including disciplinary dominance, epistemological 
dissonance, and specialist journals and funding streams that are designed to discourage it 
(Max-Neef 2005, Miller, et al. 2008). The politically-sensitive nature of natural resource 
conflicts ensures that transformative analysis presents additional difficulties of its own.  
By definition, the study of conflict is relevant to all those invested in the conflict. It is no 
surprise to find that data can be difficult to acquire from ministries intent on maintaining the 
current form of any arrangement. Especially when a water conflict is securitised, the trust (of 
the researchers, or between protagonists) required for effective analysis can be as low as the 
pressure to conform and censure findings is high. The potential peril is that the practice of 
conflict transformation will be based on partial or superficial analysis, as highly complex water 
issues  are simplified, or too much is extrapolated from too little.   
The analyst has three broad ways to deal with such difficulties. The first is to resist the analysis 
of a situation that the  individual or research team does not and cannot know much about 
within the time limits of the research project. Researchers that are not ‘plugged in’ to the 
networks of decision-makers are likely to miss a big part of the picture, or re-present the 
aspects most convincingly presented to them, whether intentionally or unintentionally.  
The second workaround is the flip-side of the first: ensure that the analytical team has the 
insight, personal networks, and trust that will enable sharp and sound analysis. This includes 
the ability to interview in the language of key informants, and thus to interpret a wide variety 
of media sources and archives. Being an ‘insider’ carries its own risks of bias. A research team 
must do better than to simply have one or two members from various perspectives of any 
conflict. The process of research needs to expose and grapple with disciplinary biases and 
blind spots, by creating spaces where differences can be fleshed out common ground can be 
found (perhaps at research workshops). Ideally, each team member should have the same 
commitment to an equitable transboundary water arrangement – and thus be able to 
acknowledge and so rise above any disabling biases. When this is not possible, as in most 
cases, biases can be declared. Just as hydrologists have been called to come clean on the 
limitation of their models (Beven 2008), so transboundary water conflict analysts would do 
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well to define what they mean when they use the terms ‘cooperation’, and ‘inequitable’. The 
quality and potential bias of the work would be that much easier to judge, at the very least. 
The third way to work around the risks of transformative analysis is to bound the limits of the 
research clearly. Some policy reports tend to mislead through confident but poorly-founded 
recommendations, and may be driven to try out new concepts and tools as one-stop shops 
for the management of water conflicts (e.g. USAID 2012). The temptation to over-stretch 
conclusions or to generalise can be replaced by stipulation of the applicability of the findings, 
instead.  
Specifying the utility of the analysis is key to its practical application. Beyond the general 
guidance this article has provide – in a nutshell: employ a hydro-social approach to critically 
evaluate the processes that establish transboundary water arrangements – the most useful 
transformative analysis will result from deep case studies that are likely to have limited 
applicability elsewhere. It is up to the research team to tailor their research to be relevant to 






Box 1: There can be smoke without fire, and other concerns with the search for 
causation 
Environment-conflict debates often centre on causation: to what extent is the violence in 
Africa associated with or due to high temperatures (Buhaug 2010), for example, or the war 
in Syria caused by drought (Selby, et al. 2017)? The very different answers that are arrived 
at reflect the epistemological grounding of positivists and those who accept the complexity 
(see Le Billon 2001), or the methods employed by the ‘quants’ and ‘quals’ (as Solow (2013) 
refers to them).  
There is good reason to reflect critically and take a position on the debate. The (very) dry 
climate of Darfur is insufficient basis for even assuming a link with the violence, to take 
one example. Consider how seriously Irish or British researchers would take the findings 
of researchers trawling for causal links between Ireland’s ‘Troubles’ and its cold and wet 
climate – especially if the analysis fails to consider how people have adapted to their 
natural setting (e.g. cooking and heating with peat). Apart from being wary of the ever-
present danger of mistaking statistical co-relation for causation, it is also crucial to review 
Darfur – or indeed any setting - on its own terms (Bromwich 2017).  
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Box 2: How very different views of ‘reality’ affect interpretation of environmental 
conflict  
On one end of the environmental conflict research spectrum is a community of strong 
environmental determinists. Researchers from this group assume and assert that water 
scarcity (or flooding) will lead to violence (or peace). At the very least, such thinking 
dismisses the hundreds of other inter-related reasons that people make war or peace (Roe 
2004, Klare 2008), and their ability to adapt (and well) to changes in water availability.  
Of much more potential use is the work of those who acknowledge that water is one 
component of conflict, often seeing it either explicitly or implicitly as a ‘threat multiplier’. 
This broad group sees knowledge as objective and ever-evolving, generally holds a 
positivist ontology or view of ‘reality’, and typically includes traditional environmental 
scientists but also social scientists. A tendency to determinism may be driven by traditional 
disciplinary methods of enquiry and hypotheses applied to the extremely complex, and 
largely separate topics of war, and water. For example, hydrologists and agronomists join 
economists to test if there is a role of drought in the Syrian crisis (e.g. Muller, et al. 2016). 
Political scientists, too, trawl databases to spot correlations between size of state, length 
of river as border, etc. (though generally all of the links found to present are not statistically 
significant (see e.g. Gleditsch, et al. 2006)). The unstated expectation is that some 
objective version of the ‘truth’ about water and conflict will be reached, as datasets 
improve and hypotheses are tweaked.  
As Selby (2017) argues, however, analytical treatment of the environment as a potential 
’threat multiplier’ is neither cautious nor rigorous. Analysts from a third group understand 
the knowledge that people create to be the result of narratives, ideas, myths and 
interpretations of history, and tends to eschew causal or binary links for deeper 
examination of the source of tensions between people and/or social institutions (e.g. Dalby 
2006). This group typically has a critical realist perspective on ‘reality’ and are traditionally 
social scientists, though are increasingly joined with broad-visioned environmental 
scientists. The focus is on the interplay of the many facets that make up a conflict, or at 
least those that initial or previous enquiries have deemed to be the most important. 
Emphasis is placed on understanding cases rather than global or regional patterns, and on 
evidence and argument, rather than on testing statistical associations for causal relations. 
Questions are more typically open-ended rather than hypothesis-driven. In the case of 
Syria, for example, this means researching how water use has changed through the 
decades, and the establishment of long-term hydro-political baselines (Phillips 2010, de 
Châtel 2015, UEA 2018). Importantly, the group accepts that the ‘truth’ about an 
environmental conflict is so subject to people’s perspectives and emotions that it is likely 
never to be known, and so there may never be proof of a  determining relation between 
water and war.  
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